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Abstract

The role ofboth economic and culturalfactors are

investigatedfor their impact onfertility rates in Kenya. Economic

factors tend tofavor rational control offertility while culturalfactors
favor uncontrolledfertility. Both demand andsupply side reasons are
presented to show thatfertility decision making isbecoming based
more on economics and rationality than on tradition. Policy
implications are investigated.

In Kenya and throughout sub-Saharan Africa, traditional
beliefs and cultural practices are thought tomaintain consistently high
fertility rates. A cultural goal ofmaintaining and enhancing the
lineage group and the influence ofanindigenous belief system that

places great importance on having children to allow dead ancestors to
return to life in the absence of strong economic disincentives

associated withchildbeaiing is saidto be an inviolable motivational
mechanism encouraging hi^ fertility. This is the thesis offered by
Caldwell and Caldwell (1987) to propose that in spiteof family

planning efforts in sub-Saharan Africa, "lineage-based systems are so
coherent...they willoffer greater resistance to thesuccess of family
planning programs than has been encountered elsewhere" (CaldweU
and Caldwell, 1987: 410). According to Caldwell and Caldwell,

unlike family planning experiences inIndia, Latin America, and East
Asia, in sub-Saharan Africa, programs intended toreduce fertility will
have little effect.

Resistance to fertility control in sub-Saharan Africa is thought
to be due to the normative effects of the indigenous African religious

beliefsystem. Cultural practices associated with ancestor worship,
37
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i.e., a nonnative system in which children give highstatus in addition
to economic value to individuals in families, disposes sub-Saharan
AJ&icans to chooseto have many children. Numerous writers on
population and fertility agree with a dual causational economic-

cultural view(Dow; Dow and Werner; Page; Sindiga; Heinin; Frank;
Frank and McNicholl; seeRobinson, 1992). Unlike the Caldwells,

however, a majority ofthese writers focus ondeveloping economic
causes of high fertility. They choosenot to develop a cultural-

anthropological view withits emphasis on determining power of
culture and cultural-religious systems. They chooseto follow a socio-

cultural economic model to explain thecause of highfertility in
Kenya andsub-Saharan Afiica. Frank andMcNicholl (1987) write of
theimpetus forhighfertility developing in the patriarchal control men
exert over women and children. In their view, Kenyan, "family

circumstances" give mensocial, economic, and legal control over
women. This control allows men to determine fertility decisions.
Mencalculate fertility decisions and choose to produce as many
children aspossible in marital unions. Menchoose highfertility in
order to produce more economic capital ~ more child bodies to sell as

brides and to work the land. Men's power over women is produced
and reproduced in male patriarchal control ofwomen's and children's
labor and men's control of fertility decisions. Patriarch's/husband's

control of land, women's labor, and food women produce; male
control of the practice of selling women children for marriage or bride
price; men's separate production of crops to sellin the market, and the
access of mento higher paying wage sources outside of the village
combine to fix andperpetuate men's social and economic power over
women. Becausemen's economic power base depends on their
control ofwomen and children, men choose to expandtheir female
and childholdings by having as many children as possible in
polygynous relationships.
Frank and McNicholl (1987) suggest that within this

patriarchal system, women enhance their situation in marriage by
voluntarily choosing to produce as many children as possible. In this
way, women please their community's, husband's, and husband's

lineage fertility desires. In an exchange relationship, women enhance
status in their community by having many children. Frank and
38
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McNichoU speak little ofreligious cultural motivation for high
fertility. The Caldwells' viewpoint is that a husband's "demographic
wishes," as orientedto the traditional systemof ancestorworship,

appear to agree witha cultural-religious interpretation. Frank and
McNicholl's reticence on the subject of a trachtional religious

motivationfor high fertilityis an example of different writers

stressing either economic-social or cultural arguments in assessing
causes of fertility motivation. Frank and McNichoU choose as
importantthe economic determinant.
The Caldwells, on the other hand, suggest that at root a deeper
cultural motivation is most determining. The Caldwells warn that in
relation to the fertility situationin sub-SaharaAftica, an over-reliance

on economic or demographic indicators maybe misleading, evenif
indicators do show fertility rates to be going down. They suggestthat
however diffuse or subconscious traditional cultural motivational

factors may appear to be, the traditional beliefstructure in subSaharan Africa will continue to thrive and function to provide a

powerful high fertility normative framework guiding individuals'
actions. Further, they suggest any change effect caused by the
economic realmmaybe temporary and that cultural motivations wiU

again reassert. The Caldwells also warn quantitative researchers not
to be fooled; that although in quantitative analyses traditional cultural
motivations may appear to be weakening, the defining and
determining value of cultural beliefs andpractices are a blackbox to

this type of analysis. They say thatin spite of demographic measures
indicating the contrary, in sub-Saharan Africa traditional beliefs will
remain pervasiveand a force for higfr fertility.
In 1990*s Kenya, we see the fertilityrate decline, and the

deteimining power of tradition appears to be weakening. With
increased education, modem media, and post-colonial "capitalist"
colonization ofthe village economy, the power of traditional

normative practices to determine action appear to be declining. In
Kenya in the 1990s, in spite of a still pervasive beliefin hi^ fertility,
a growing perception is that thehigh cost ofraising children makes
having too many children too expensive. Demand for smaller
families and contraceptive services is on the rise. Evidence is that

government and other family planning programs are meeting
39
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increased demand for contraceptive services, and fertility levels in
Kenya are declining as a result. The 1989 Kenya Demographic
Health Survey (KDHS), probably themost comprehensive measure of
fertility in Kenya, and other quantitative and qualitative studies
(reviewed in Robinson, 1992), point to attitudinal and behavioral

changes among Kenyans ofboth sexes in regard to reproductive
practice and limiting family size. A greater acceptance and use of
family planning and contraceptive practices hasbeen a result of these

attitudinal changes, and increased use of contraception has ledto
modest, butnevertheless significant, declines in fertility measures.
The KDHS survey reports a 17 percent decline in total fertility rate
during the years 1977 to 1989 (Robinson, 1992: 446).
Numerous smaller scale studies (reviewed in Robinson, 1992)
confirm the KDHS findings. They too find reasons for changed
fertihty attitudes in increased perception of costs associated with
raising children. Jensen and Juma (1989) found links to the

marketplace generate a desire for lowered fertility and also that
women with directlinks to the market expected to givebirth to more
children than they feltwouldbe convenient; among women with ties
to the market there existed strong feelings concerning therising costs
of bringing up children (Jensen andJuma, 1989, firom Robinson,
1992).

As Kenyans aredrawn into themoney economy ~ in Kenya
onlya few nomadic peoples remain outside it —perceived costs of
bringing up children increasingly influence fertility motivations and
decisions. Though large families are still the norm, both rural and
urban women and men are cognizant of the economic costs of child
rearing (Robinson, 1992). A major survey of men's attitudes occurred

in 1988. Responding to international donor criticism that thefamily
planning program in Kenyawas overly oriented toward women, the
Kenyan National Council on Population andDevelopment funded a

study offertility attitudes ofKenyan males. Althou^ Kenyan men
were found to continueto believe in polygynyand the status benefits

of a large family, they also expressed concem with therising costs of
raising children and especially the high costs of educating them
(Kivuto Ndeti, 1989,fi-om Robinson, 1992).
What then of the Caldwells' beliefthat the cultural system of
40
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sub-Saharan Africa is impenneableto the efforts of familyplanning?
Why are attitudes changingand the economic determinant becoming
morepronounced? Whydo governmental programs and other efforts
to reduce fertilityin Kenyanow appearto be working some thirty

years after theirinception when recent demand for family planning
services was so low (12.4% currentuse for any method in 1977/78)
and family planning programs in Kenya were so recently (1987)
deemed a failure (Frank and McNicholl, 1987; Caldwell and
Caldwell, 1987)? The answers to these questions lie in the
adaptability of Kenyan cultural norms, the Kenyan government's
timely commitmentto increasethe scopeof government clinic-based
and other health service delivery programs, and "demand" based
government policies centering on education and land reform.
Modernization and Change: The Demand Side

Since independence in 1963, the Kenyan government has
followed a pohcy ofland redistribution and mass education.
Governmentland programs, breaking-up large land holdings, and
transferring formerly communally held lands into private holdings as
early as 1969had created in Kenya whatthe BritishwriterKillick
(1981) describes as a "squirearchy, convinced in the soundness of the

political economy of capitalist development...holding a substantial
investment in the system." The widespread practice of free-hold title
landholding initiated afterindependence transformed the nationinto a
country oflandowners, a nation of small subsistence farmers. The

practice of freehold land titlefurthered a process undermining the
authorityof village elders and fragmenting the coherency of clanbased lineage systems. In the new capitalist Kenya, the many
individual freehold title landholders responded not so much to dictates
and normative structures of lineage and village leaders, but as small
farmers they responded moreto cost-benefit analyses andto media
circulating in the marketplace. In today's Kenya, the process of
modernization and capitalization has proceeded apace. According to

Robinson (1992), "nearly all" Kenyans now "pay taxes, interact with a
non-tribal civil authority, listen to the radio and send their childrento
Westemstyle schools" (454). As small capitalists or wageworkers, a
41
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majority ofKenyans are now part of a modem cash economy. As
part of the modem market economy, they are increasingly conscious
ofcosts associated with raising children. Economics and changes in
the market economy have had impact on the traditional organization
of lineage structureand the family, what economist-demographers
have told us is the cause of lower fertility.
Costs of educating childrenis probablythe most important
economic determinant explaining fertility decline in Kenya (KDHS
survey, 1989). Kenyan education has been a consistent growth
industry (Court, 1974). Kenyansplace value on education, and the
Kenyan government has within the past twenty-five years devoted a

high proportion of government resources (upto 12% of GDP) to
develop schools and train teachers. In 1990, the writer David Coiu-t
commented in a personal interview to Robinson (1992):

One of the factors that distinguishes Kenya from other African
countries exceptNigeria has been the explosive growth of the
secondary school system and student population in the past
fifteen years. Secondary schools are everywherewith the
social pressures to attend and associated economic costs. The

effect of a fee-based cost sharingprogramto pay for this large
educational system has meant parents are increasingly
conscious ofthe costs of schooling children (Robinson, 1992:
457).

An increasedawareness ofcosts associated with having
children and an increasein demandfor contraceptive serviceshas
been met with recent improvements in quantity and quality of
government family planning and health services provided.
Contraceptive supplyhas largelymet demand, and reduced fertility
levelsin Kenya have been the result. The determining power of
cultural practices and beliefs that fimction to keep fertilityhigh appear
to be weakening. The barrier that as late as 1987 the Caldwells

characterized as so powerful as to make insignificant the potential for
fertihty declines in Kenya and elsewhere in sub-Saharan Africa

(though the Caldwells have warned us not to jump to conclusions
concerning this) appears to be coming down. In Kenya, changed
42
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attitudes which signify the determining power of traditional beliefs
and practices are adapting to economic and other modernizing effects.
Changed fertility attitudes have led to the increased use of
contraception, andthis has led to a lowering of the fertihtyrate. In
the 1975-77 period, for example, the total fertility rate for Kenyan
women was 8,1; in 1984 the rate was 7.7; the 1989 rate was 6.7.

Clearly, surveyed Kenyan women were having fewer children.
According to the 1989 KDHS report, in Kenya, "Amajor cause of the
decline in fertility is increased use of family planning" (KDHS, 1989).
The media too has had an effect on changing fertility attitudes

andpractices in Kenya. In 198, even the Caldwells conceded this
somewhatand were suggesting that western style ideas and images

hadpermeated Kenya, andmedia messages were moving sub-Saharan
Africans in the direction of limiting fertility. According to the
Caldwells, in 1987 "recurrentproblemswith faltering economic

growth and uncertain food supplies...." in addition to "secular forces,
such as external models of the family taught by the media and the
schools..." are in Kenya "producing a societywhere the conjugal

family is emotionally more dominant and homage to living ancestors
less so." TheCaldwells appear to believe thatemotional nucleation

precedes economic nucleation, though from the reading I have done it
appears to methatinKenya increased emotional nucleation does not
necessarily precedeeconomic nucleation. Perhaps this is another
example of the Caldwells' culture or the social bonddefining the
economic relationship. Nevertheless, whatever the initialreason
families nucleate, in Kenya the forces of modernization are the cause.
The Supply Side

As we have seen, the idea that sub-Saharan societies are

immuneto the effects of family planningprogramsappears in the case
of Kenyato be proving wrong. According to recentevidence

(Robinson, 1992, a review of village and other studies), the Kenyan
family planning program, though beginnmg slowly and with perhaps
less than full governmental support, has since 1982 reinvigorated its
efforts and is nowexperiencing success. Thecurrent success of the
Kenyan program began in 1982 when inresponse to pressure from
43
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international donors the Kenyangovernment createdthe National
Council on Population andDevelopment. Thepurpose of the Council
was to coordinate the activities of government andprivate family

planning agencies and to coordinate theexpansion offamily planning
efforts in Kenya, With increased governmental support, by themid1980s the number of trained health workers andpoints of service
delivery throughout Kenya increased dramatically (World Bank
Office, 1990).
In 1981-82, for example, there were 1,027 trained health

workers in Kenya. In 1987-1988, that numberhad risen to 2,170. In

the same time period, government Ministry ofHealth service delivery
points grew from less than 100 to 465. Demand forfamily planning
services was growing too asthe number ofhealth care acceptors rose
from roughly 100,000 in 1984 to over 300,000 in 1988. Other

developments such as an increase in contraceptive methods available
(Depo-provera, an injectable, became available) and an increase in
private sector familyplanningprograms similarly contributed to an

increase in theavailability andacceptors of health and reproductive
services in Kenya. In 1989, the KDHS studyreported: "Eight in ten
births [in Kenya] benefit from ante-natal care from a doctor, nurse or
midwife, and one-halfof births are assisted at delivery by a doctor,
nurse, or midwife." By 1990, the Kenyan government was reportiag
that though "as late as 1986" the government program "was rated
weak and poor in the intemational literature...substantial

improvements haveprobably taken placein thelastfew years [and] an
overall rating of moderate is suggested as more appropriate today"
(The PopulationCouncil, 1990). In terms of the quality ofcare, the
Population Council suggested a rating of "moderately high."
In Kenya, then, the government and private sector have
increased familyplanning and health servicedeliveryto meet an
increased contraceptive need. Government md private programs have
enacted a system of contraceptive supply that appears to be largely
meeting a growing demand for family planning services, although
more in the way ofproviding health care remains to be done

(Robinson, 1992). High fertility culturalpractices, the norms

associated withtraditional-religious practices, appear to be adapting
as people are confronted with an increased awareness of the cost of
44
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raising children. The central role of reproduction in traditional
religion and culture, the religious barrierto lower fertility Caldwell
and Caldwell (1987) suggesthas been impermeable to the challenge
of an economic demand, is thus apparently weakening in the face of
economic and cultural modernization.

One modernization variable the Caldwells mention as an

aspect of culture that is weakening thedetennining power of
traditional practices andbeliefs is the growing influence of nontraditional religions in sub-Saharan Africa. Traditional practices and
beliefs are under assault from the spread ofChristianity and Islam

throu^out sub-Saharan Africa. For instance, Caldwell andCaldwell
(1987) suggest thatthe onslaught of indigenous-led Christian and
Islamic "purificatory" movements, combined withthepower of
Islam's and Christianity's "internalrather than extemalmoral

justification" will result in a further ~ perhaps dramatic —decline in
orpurging oftraditional beliefs and practices in sub-Saharan Africa
(Caldwell and Caldwell, 1987:433). In this conceptualization,
traditional beliefs and values of pleasing one's ancestors give way to a
moreindividualistic, personal relationship with a single god. High

fertihty, the traditional mode in which ancestors are placated and
allowedto reincarnate to Earthly hfe, will be of less importance, less a
motivational factor in reproductive decisions influenced by a final
destination Heaven. The belief that dead ancestors harm those women

who donot givebirthto theculturally defined normative ntunber of
childrenwill thus fade...to lurk perhaps (as is now evidentamong elite

couples in African cities) as a more imconscious, subliminal, or
subconscious motivation to high fertility.
Policy Implications

Thespread of the market economy andfreehold titleland
holding, andan increased perception of the cost ofraising children

(though theculturalists wam us tobewaxy ofmere demographic
measures) are apparently weakening thedetermining power of
traditional high fertility cultural practices in Kenya. Traditional
beliefs and the high fertihtythey encourage now appear to be less
determining. The powerof these traditional norms appears to have
45
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been replaced bymore an economic consideration in fertility
decisions. This changein the high fertility attitudeis due to the
growing perception thatthe costs of having many children

increasingly outweigh thebenefits. Thus, it is thought an economic
causation increasingly determines the reproductive decision. High
fertility and traditional beliefs and practices persist, however,
although in Kenya increasingly norm and practice diverge. The
practice is increasingly to use contraception and limit family size. In
practice, the norm oftradition is weakened until perhaps middle-class
urban dwellers returnto relations in the country, where theirkin and

fellow lineage members persuade them todo their duty tothelineage
and increasechildbearing. According to the Caldwells and firom a
cultural interpretation, in such situations traditional beliefs have not

lost their determining effect. Implicit in the Caldwells* cultural ideal

is thatthough economic circumstances may change, culture willretain

its defining value. When economic or social conditions again change
andbecome more favorable, culture willreassert and again become
most determining; high fertilityideas may again be the norm.

PoHcy suggestions forthe further lowering of fertility rates in
Kenyainclude increasing efforts to provide Kenyans with the means
for social and livelihood security, for increasing education, and for

increasing access to improved agricultural and domestic technologies.
Adams and Castle (1994, fi:om Sen) suggestsuch structural
enhancement will allow gradually nucleating families increased

security without resorting to a reliance onhigh fertility and to produce
the needed children to provide labor andold agesecurity. Also,
legislative efforts to empower women, like the 1972 Kenyan law
providing for the uniform treatment of male and female children in

property ownership and inheritance (theLaw of Succession Act), may
allow women greater power in marriage and society andincrease
women's fi*eedom to make theirown fertility decisions. In Kenya,
however, thepatriarchal system is so entrenched that governmental
support for and enforcement of laws that empower women maybe
lacking. Without strict enforcement, in practice such laws may
remain largely ineffective (Frank and McNicholl, 1987). NGO's and
other women's groups, then, and perhaps donor agencies who may tie
governmental aid to theestablishment and monitoring of human rights
46
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guarantees, must revamp their efforts topressure orconvince the
Kenyan government and Kenyan men and women to modify themost
inequitable aspects ofthe patriarchal system. With increased
educational and structural governmental assistance, increasingly

Kenyans ofbothsexes might view thecultural barriers to lower
fertility as increasingly impractical. In a modernizing, successfully
progressive capitalist society, the beliefthat high fertility norms may
belimiting ofnational and personal success may then gain widespread
acceptance. Precipitous declines in fertility may occur.
Or, andthisis the other sideof the equation (the Caldwells'),
with modem economic success or favorable social conditions, perhaps

fertility may re-increase. As conditions are ripe for a re-emergence of
traditional beliefe andpractices, fertility rates mayagain climb in

spite ofthe extra costs ofchildren. This would be a re-emergence of
culture, a re-emergence of tradition, perhaps beginmng when
favorable economic or social circumstances return. It would be a

revitalization of the traditional religiousbeliefs and practices that

were formerly dampened, but not extinguished, by difficult or

challenging social conditions or economic circumstances. Inthis
instance, the determining power of culture would reassert itself, to

again dominate and determine the social and economic realm. Kenya
has only recently gained independence, as the Caldwells suggest, and
perhaps the fertility declines experienced inthe 1990s are part ofa
general equalization trend, the longitudinal adjustment tothe
dislocations of independence or a prolonged recession. Perhaps, as
the Caldwells have suggested all along, the determinmg power of
culture will return when the economics of independencehave been
worked out and the economic and social situation is more stable.
Students of the economic cause, of course, would call this

revival ofhigh fertility ananomaly. Forthem, theeffects of a
modernizing society make it anirrational exchange decision to persist
in having large families when the costs ofraising many children are
high. This isthe limitation ofthe economic view. Economists and
othernon-culturalists havetrouble with and cannot adequately explain

or predict seemingly non-rational, non-economic causes for action.
Here lies thenugget ofthe Caldwells' and theculturalist perspective's
wisdom: economics cannot explain these black boxes ofirrationality;
47
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culture often can. Cost-benefit paradigms are inadequate to explain
themultivaiiate mechanisms ofpractice. The study of motivations
textually locked in culture and the normative ideas embodied in the

traditional belief system ofancestor worship can help us explain our
analysis and help uspredict demographic changes of the future. In
relation to the fertility situation inKenya, as the Caldwells suggest,
the determining power ofculture should not betoo quickly brushed
aside.
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